s focus on mitigation. rough adaptation, however, regions can also decrease the level of climate change damages they face. rough adjustments in social or economic systems regions can moderate potential damages or bene t from opportunities associated with climate change (Smit et al.  ). An important difference between these two measures is that mitigation is a public good whereas adaptation is a private good.
In the literature on s adaptation is not explicitly considered, but implicitly included in the damage function; or not considered at all. In fact, the only cases where it is mentioned are in Barrett () and Zehaie () . Barrett assumes that players rst choose whether or not to join a coalition aer which they set their adaptation levels. As adaptation is chosen aer the coalition formation process it will have no effect on the process as any threats of higher (or lower) levels of adaptation will not be credible.
Zehaie () studies the strategic role of adaptation in a two-stage two-player model where regions in the rst stage of the game invest in adaptation and in the second stage choose their mitigation levels.
He nds that adaptation can have a strategic role when the two regions do not cooperate and when the two regions cooperate on mitigation only. Increased irreversible investments in adaptation in one region decreases the need for mitigation in that region, increasing the level of mitigation in the second region.
ere are several limitations to the Zehaie ()'s study. Firstly, he only considers two regions, whereas any climate coalition would include many players. Secondly, he does not consider how adaptation will affect the coalition formation and stability. irdly, he does not consider a sharing rule for the benets of the mitigation cooperation. Fourthly, though he can show theoretically that adaptation can have a strategic effect, whether this is in fact possible in practice remains undetermined. For overinvestment of proactive adaptation to be worthwhile the bene ts need to outweigh the costs. Parameter estimates of adaptation and mitigation costs and bene ts are needed to understand if in fact adaptation can strategically affect mitigation choices. Finally, Zehaie, like Barrett, treats adaptation as a homogeneous issue, without considering the varying forms of adaptation and the roles they can play. In this paper we address these issues.
Based on their timing, adaptation measures can be categorised as either proactive (anticipatory) or reactive. Proactive adaptation refers to adaptation measures taken before climate change occurs. ese measures are oen large scale and irreversible. Reactive adaptation takes place in reaction to climate change where costs and bene ts are felt simultaneously. To illustrate these different forms of adaptation we use an example. Heat and droughts associated with climate change will cause increasing amounts of crops to fail.
To limit the losses both reactive and anticipatory adaptation can be applied. Reactive adaptation options include using more water (where irrigation systems are in place), changes to other more heat resistant crop types or changing the planting times of the crops. Proactive adaptation measures include investments in irrigation systems or investments in the development of different more heat resistant crop types.
Adaptation investments which are irreversible, such as proactive adaptation, limit the amount of climate change damages for a region far into the future. An adaptation capital is built up of which the bene ts will be reaped in the future. Such an investment changes the damages of climate change for a region thereby changing its business as usual damages and mitigation level. is may give a region a strategic advantage in an  game.  Adaptation as described in Barrett () that takes place aer the coalition formation process or can be adjusted aer the formation process is comparable to reactive adaptation. Irreversible adaptation investments as described in Zehaie () are comparable to the proactive (stock) adaptation. We distinguish between these two forms of adaptation in our analysis of mitigation coalition formation. Reactive adaptation will have no effects on the coalition formation process and we can implicitly include this adaptation in the damage function.
We present a three-stage non-cooperative cartel game of coalition formation, where in the rst stage the level of proactive adaptation is chosen. In the second stage (the coalition formation stage) regions choose whether to join a unique coalition or not. e third stage of the game is a transboundary mitigation game, where mitigation and reactive adaptation levels are set to maximise pay-offs. In this stage the coalition acts as a single player maximising coalition bene ts. e model can then be solved for the optimal levels of proactive adaptation and mitigation using backward induction. An analytic solution can, however, only be found given a coalition.
We, therefore, introduce an applied model (-) which incorporates adaptation into the existing  model. is model checks all possible coalitions () between  geo-political regions for external and internal stability to nd stable coalitions. We use this model to examine the effects of different levels of proactive adaptation. Regions will need to set their level of adaptation beforehand without the knowledge of which coalition will be formed. us, though the model does not include uncertainty there is uncertainty over which coalition will form.
Applying -, we rst study what effects the different levels of adaptation will have on the incentives to withdraw from the Grand Coalition () . Secondly, we study the best performing stable coalition and investigate whether over-adaptation or under-adaptation by a single region can be used to increase its payoffs.
In the second section we introduce our three-stage game theoretical model. Using backward induction the optimal level of proactive adaptation and mitigation are found for both coalition members and nonmembers. In the third section a numerical model (-) is introduced which incorporates adaptation into the existing  model. e fourth section presents our results and the nal section concludes.
 Model
In this paper, we interpret  formation as a coalitional game between heterogeneous regions. We model this interaction as an extensive form game played in three stages. In the rst stage regions choose their proactive adaptation levels simultaneously. Given this in the second stage regions choose whether to join a coalition or not. Here coalition is understood as a binding agreement, where multi-coalitions are not possible. In the nal stage regions set their mitigation levels. e three stages are referred to as: If a region acts as a singleton it maximises its individual net bene ts, i.e. minimises the sum of its individual climate change damages, adaptation costs and mitigation costs. Signatories maximise joint net bene ts of all agreement members. As the coalition acts as one player and as all singletons are individual players there are |N | − |S| + 1 players in the transboundary pollution game. By using backward induction we can analyse our three-stage game. erefore, the stages of our game will be described backwards.
Stage : e transboundary pollution game In this stage the levels of proactive adaptation p i are xed and the agreement of stage  has become binding for the signatories S ⊆ N . Each player i then sets its level of mitigation q i simultaneously, where q i ∈ [0,ē i ], whereē i is the regional business as usual ( ) emissions. e mitigation bene ts for each player depend on the total level of global mitigation.
Where total mitigation is given as the sum of all individual mitigation efforts; q = ∑ i ∈N q i . Climate change costs consist of the sum of residual damages, adaptation costs and mitigation costs. e residual damages (which implicitly include optimal reactive adaptation) are given by: e bene ts of adaptation and mitigation are the avoided damages, which are given as the  damages minus the actual damages, assuming that in the  case proactive adaptation is zero and no mitigation measures are taken. We can now write the payoffs of each player i of climate change policies:
e payoffs to each player (the coalition and the non-signatories) are a function of the unique coalition formed. Each coalition is associated with a unique optimal level of proactive adaptation and mitigation for each player. We can now restate the payoffs of abatement and adaptation ( W i 
as a function of the coalition formed. Here we assume that optimal mitigation levels are adopted as these are a function of the coalition formed. We nd the payoffs as a function of others and regional mitigation for non-signatories :
e coalition payoffs represents the value of the coalition, i.e. the sum of climate policy bene ts minus policy costs over all coalition member regions:

In our model the gains of the coalition are shared among its members using the optimal sharing rule as proposed by Weikard (). We use a sharing rule where the coalition bene ts are shared according to each region's bene ts if they choose not to join the coalition, i.e.
Here there is a coalition S with members j . Member i chooses to join the coalition or not. If the region i chooses to leave, the coalition le is denoted as S −i . e bene ts region i would receive outside the coalition are denoted as V i (S −i ). Hence the larger a region's outside option, the larger its share of coalition payoffs will be.
An optimal sharing rule will guarantee internal stability of a coalition whenever that is at all feasible, 
 Analysis of Optimal Proactive Adaptation in Mitigation Strategies
Stage  We rst look at the last stage of the game, where the mitigation level is chosen. As the level of proactive adaptation is chosen in the rst stage, a level mitigation can be chosen in the third stage given the level of proactive adaptation. In the nal stage a region is either a singleton or a coalition member, depending on its choice in the second stage. We will rst discuss the case of a singleton.
A singleton maximises its own bene ts given the level of others mitigation. In that case q i is chosen to maximise V i , which is given as the bene ts of climate change policies (adaptation and mitigation) minus the costs. is is given by Equation :
In the last stage of the game a level of mitigation q i is chosen given the level of adaptation chosen in the rst stage. Note that we do not consider coalition formation just now, i.e. the coalition S is given at this stage.
e optimal level of mitigation for a singleton in the third stage for a given level of proactive adaptation can then be derived using the rst order condition: When a region is a coalition member it will choose its mitigation level as to maximise coalition payoffs.
ese bene ts are given as the sum of the individual bene ts of all coalition members:
Maximising this with respect to regional abatement we nd;
Comparing equations  and , we can see that the optimal level of mitigation of a coalition member will be higher than for the singleton. In the singleton case only the bene ts of mitigation (avoided damages)
to the singleton were considered. In the case of the coalition member the bene ts to all other coalition members are considered in addition. Furthermore, the optimal level of mitigation for a coalition member will increase in the coalition size.
Stage  In the coalition formation stage a Nash equilibrium is given by a vector of rati cation decisions (σ i ) i ∈N such that no single region would prefer to change its decision. A coalition S a stable coalition if the strategy pro le (σ i ) i ∈N that corresponds to S is a Nash equilibrium. A coalition is stable if it is both internally and externally stable (d ' Aspremont et al. ) . A coalition is internally stable if and
Given the large number of asymmetric regions in this game, the number of possible coalitions is large. We cannot derive analytically for each coalition whether it is stable or not, but will use our applied model in Section . We move on to the rst stage of the game and solve the model for a given coalition.
Stage  Now we can turn to the rst stage of the game to nd the optimal level of proactive adaptation. A region's optimal level of proactive adaptation will depend on two factors, rstly the global level of mitigation and secondly whether and in which coalition the region will be. Hence for each coalition there is a unique optimal level of adaptation for members and non-members. As the agreement only refers to mitigation decisions, in the adaptation decision in the rst stage, each region will maximise its own benets. At this stage there are no obligations to other (future) members of the coalition. We rst assume that  mitigation in the third stage is given, later we de ne the level of mitigation for each coalition, in terms of the level of proactive adaptation.
Optimising equation  with respect to the level of proactive adaptation leads to the optimal level for singletons:
However when a region is a coalition member its level of proactive adaptation will affect the value of the coalition as well as the regions share of the coalition bene t. A coalition member's share of the coalition value is given by V k (S), this was de ned in Equation . e coalition member will set his proactive adaptation level to maximise this. Hence, the following rst order condition must hold:
Assuming:
we have:
furthermore:
Resulting in:
Where q S is the total level of emissions, given the coalition S, which can be written in terms of p i , where regions denoted by f are singletons and regions denoted by j are coalition members.
us we nd a unique level of proactive adaptation given the other regions' levels of proactive adaptation for both the singleton and coalition member in a speci c coalition. is problem is too complex to study further in an analytical framework. Hence we develop the - model in the next section to run empirical simulations of coalitions.
 e - Model
e original  model consists of a two-stage, non-cooperative game of coalition formation. e - model adds an additional stage to the  model which takes place before the two stages of . ese three stages are in essence identical to those described in Section . is rst stage is the proactive adaptation stage where a level of proactive adaptation is chosen based on the expectation of which coalition will form. Investments in adaptation will decrease the residual damages associated with climate change in the future. e second stage is the coalition formation stage and the third the transboundary pollution game.
e welfare of the regions in the model is based on a payoff function, which represents the discounted net bene ts from mitigation (i.e. mitigation efforts) and adaptation over the model horizon. We assume that undiscounted bene ts in each period depend not only on the current global mitigation level but also on global mitigation in previous periods through reduced concentrations of ₂ and correspondingly lower gross damage levels; in contrast, mitigation costs only depend on current mitigation levels within the region. e level of proactive adaptation is set in the rst stage but the costs and bene ts of adaptation are felt each period throughout the planning horizon.
We refer to the situation where none of the regions choose to join the coalition as "All Singletons;" () the associated optimal mitigation paths are an open loop Nash equilibrium. In the "Grand Coalition‚Ä ()ù, all regions cooperate and global marginal mitigation costs and bene ts are equated achieving the social optimum. If no region can receive a higher payoff by diverging, i.e. by unilaterally changing its strategy, the coalition structure is called stable. us a coalition is stable if it adheres to internal stability and externally stability.
Emission permit trading is incorporated in the model to allow for transfers among regions in the coalition, such that emission permits can be traded only among signatories. e transfers imply that if a region reduces its emissions more than required for achieving the assigned emission permit level, the region can sell permits to other signatories. e price of a permit is endogenous and equals marginal mitigation costs (as a result of the cost-bene t analysis). Emission trading in the model ensures that the global optimum will be achieved and creates a tool to incorporate the sharing rule of a coalition. We apply two different allocation schemes:
. No permit trading, where each year the distribution of permits follows from the actual emissions;
i.e. no transfers are allowed. Table  : Parameter values of -, where the cost and bene t parameters are given as a fraction of the original net damages no effect on the coalition formation process, this form adaptation can be implicitly included in the damage Table  gives the adaptation cost parameter estimates for the various regions. In this paper we focus on three levels of adaptation, which we refer to as  adaptation,  adaptation and no adaptation. ese levels refer to the optimal level of proactive adaptation in the All Singletons case and the optimal proactive adaptation level in the Grand Coalition case. Both these levels are presented in Table  . ese levels of optimal adaptation refer to the optimal levels assuming there are no strategic advantages of proactive adaptation by coalition members.
 Results

. Analysis of the Grand Coalition
e chosen level of proactive adaptation will affect the payoffs of regions in the  and the incentives of regions to remain in the . We examine two (extreme) levels of proactive adaptation, in which all regions choose the same level of adaptation. Firstly, assuming that all regions simultaneously choose the  level of proactive adaptation, i.e. the optimal level of proactive adaptation given that no coalition will form (). is is the highest credible level of adaptation as it coincides with the adaptation level associated with the highest possible temperature in the model, i.e. the temperature when there is no mitigation cooperation.
Secondly, assuming that all regions simultaneously set their level of proactive adaptation at the  level, i.e. the optimal level given the formation of the . is is the lowest credible level of proactive adaptation as it coincides with the lowest temperature in the model (when there is global cooperation in mitigation). Table  : Payoffs in the Grand Coalition with optimal transfers and without transfers in  over the time horizon ( years) in billion  When there are no transfers between regions, two regions are not better off in the Grand Coalition compared to no coalition. ese regions are  and . As these regions have low marginal abatement costs they will have high levels of mitigation in the Grand Coalition. When no transfers take place these regions cannot be compensated for their high levels of mitigation by other regions. In the case of no transfers some regions have a higher gains from the Grand Coalition when adapting at the  level compared to  level the and others not. e regions that are worse off when  adaptation is chosen are , ,  and . ese regions have relatively low marginal abatement costs and hence in the Grand Coalition, these regions will have high abatement levels to compensate other regions' damages. If regions over-adapt, by applying the  level of adaptation, their damages will decrease resulting in a lower optimal level of global abatement. Hence low abatement cost regions are better off when all regions over-adapt. In the case of optimal transfers all regions are better off in the Grand Coalition  adaptation is globally optimal.
When regions choose to adapt at the  level, the difference in payoffs between the Grand Coalition and All Singletons case decreases. is is a logical consequence as the payoffs in the All singletons case are maximised when  adaptation is applied and the Grand coalition payoffs are maximised when  adaptation is applied. in the  when  adaptation is applied than when  adaptation is chosen. is is due to the decreased abatement under  adaptation, leading to lower payoffs for these regions in the . ese regions both have high damage levels and would bene t in a coalition without transfers, where they would not have to compensate other regions for their mitigation efforts. Other regions have a higher incentive to remain in the  when  adaptation is applied as this results in lower mitigation commitments in the  for these regions. In the case of optimal transfers, a lower level of proactive adaptation ( adaptation) will lead to higher abatement commitments in the . is, in turn, increases the free rider incentives of regions and hence the incentives of regions to withdraw from the coalition. Even though all regions unanimously prefer the  level of adaptation in the  (per de nition), applying  adaptation will in fact increase the incentives of regions to withdraw from the coalition.
.. Analysis of Stable Coalitions
e stable coalitions that form will depend on the level of proactive adaptation chosen in the rst stage.
Here we compare the stable coalitions found when regions simultaneously and uniformly set their proactive adaptation at either  or  levels. We only examine the case of optimal transfers. e ten best performing coalitions are given in . e performance of a coalition is measured by the  of global payoff increases as compared to the  case. is is given as a percentage of gains from cooperation, i.e.
global payoffs in excess of the All Singletons global payoff. e best performing stable coalition found in  - is the coalition between , , ,  and  achieving some  of  of the gains of the Grand Coalition. is coalition is stable when either  adaptation or  adaptation. All of the ten best performing coalitions include either ,  or , these being the regions who contribute the most to the gains from the cooperation (see Table  is is because as the bene ts of cooperation decrease (when more adaptation takes place) they are more likely to be stable (Barrett ) . However, several stable coalitions form in the case of  adaptation that do not form in the case of  adaptation, as  adaptation increases the damages of regions, increasing their incentives to join a coalition. e stable coalitions unique to each adaptation level, are given in Table    .
Examining Table  , we can for example see that the coalition between , ,  and  is stable when  adaptation is applied but not when  is applied. In contrast, the coalition between , , ,  and  is stable with  adaptation but not when  adaptation is applied. When adaptation decreases  wants to join the coalition between , ,  and  making it externally unstable.
Note that in , the best performing coalition is that between , , ,  and  achieving slightly higher performance than the coalition between , , ,  and  (Nagashima et al. ) . However, when explicitly including adaptation and setting it at either the ,  level or at the level optimal in this speci c coalition, this coalition becomes unstable.
is is because as adaptation decreases the damages in  increase to such a degree that it becomes worthwhile for  to join the coalition. e same is valid for  where the coalition between , ,  and  becomes externally unstable under  adaptation as  wishes to join it. Furthermore, when adaptation is lower, a coalition is stable between three of the main players, i.e. ,  and . is coalition is not internally stable in the  case as the damage levels in  and  are too high, resulting in high levels of mitigation for .  has an incentive to leave this coalition and free ride on the others' mitigation. However, when the damages of  and  are limited through a higher level of adaptation the coalition becomes bene cial to  and hence the coalition is stable in the  case.
. Analysis of the Best Performing Stable Coalition
To get a better understanding of the strategic role that proactive adaptation can play, we now consider what effects a unilateral divergence of coalition members would have on their payoffs in the best performing stable coalition (the coalition between , , ,  and ). Firstly, we examine the case where regions, when deciding their level of adaptation in the rst stage of the game, adapt at the  level.
Secondly, we assume that regions in the rst stage expect that no coalition will form and adapt at the  level. Table  : e difference in payoffs in percentage in the case of unilateral over-adaptation ( by diverger and  by others) for the best performing coalition, where coalition members are denoted by * Looking at the rst case, i.e. when a singleton unilaterally increases its proactive adaptation to the  level while the other regions' adaptation remains at the  level. We refer to this as unilateral overadaptation. Table  presents the changes in payoffs in the best performing stable coalition for the diverging region, for all coalition members excluding the diverging region, for all coalition members, for all singletons and for all regions (global payoffs). Examining the case of unilateral over-adaptation by a singleton, we see that over-adaptation results in higher payoffs for the diverging singleton. e diverging region increases its adaptation level and reduces its mitigation level, while the mitigation of others remains Table  : Percentage change in outside option payoffs due to unilateral over-adaptation ( by diverger and  by others) the same, on balance increasing its payoffs. e payoffs to the other players, and thus also to the coalition decrease as the mitigation level of the diverging region has decreased. e total singletons payoffs increase due to the diverging region's increased payoffs. e total global effect is in most cases negligible, but in the case of larger regions ( and ) slightly positive. Note that though global payoffs increase in the case of divergence by ( and ), environmentally the world is worse off as less mitigation is undertaken.
Diverging region
Diverging region payoffs
Coalition payoffs excluding diverging region Coalition payoffs
Singletons' payoffs
Global payoffs
When a coalition member diverges and over-adapts, this region again bene ts, for the same reasons as above. e bene ts of divergence are, however, larger for coalition members than singletons. By overadapting a diverging coalition member can increase its outside option payoffs, as shown in Table  . By increasing its outside option payoffs, it increases its share in the division of the coalitional surplus of coalition members. In this way, due to the sharing rule of the coalition, the diverging region can increase its coalition payoffs. From Table  we see that the payoffs of the other coalition members decrease while total coalition payoffs increase. Furthermore, when a coalition member diverges, total singleton payoffs decrease as the mitigation level in the coalition will decrease. In the case of a divergence by  the negative effect on other regions outweighs the positive effect for  and the global payoffs decrease.  is a major player with high damages, increasing its adaptation by diverging will decrease the level of mitigation in the coalition to such a degree that global bene ts decrease.
e results for under-adaptation and over-adaptation are symmetric in this speci cation and coalition. In the case of unilateral under-adaptation, the diverging region sets adaptation at  while all other regions set their adaptation at the  level. When a region diverges, its payoffs decrease. As mitigation levels remain the same a reduction in adaptation decreases the diverging region's payoffs. As the diverging region applies more mitigation to compensate for the lower level of adaptation, all other regions bene t.
.. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we undertake a sensitivity analysis of our results. We rst examine the potential role of strategic over-adaptation. We then set proactive adaptation at the level optimal for singletons in the best is result is due to the fact that the best performing coalition is roughly halfway between the  and the  in terms of gains and our model is linear. erefore, any diversions from the optimum in either way will have symmetric effects. us the unilateral bene ts of over-adaptation are the same as the costs of unilateral under-adaptation. Furthermore, the effect on other regions' payoffs is symmetrical. performing stable coalition ( level) and examine what effect that will have on the best performing coalition stability and the results concerning over and under-adaptation.
Diverting region
Diverting region payoffs Coalition payoffs excluding diverting region
Coalition payoffs
Singletons' payoffs
Global payoffs Table  : Differences in payoffs in percentages between new best performing coalition (with unilateral extreme over-adaptation of ) and original best performing coalition
In Table  the payoffs of a unilateral divergence to  of the  level are given. In this case regions over-adapt by a large amount. e extra costs of adaptation outweigh the bene ts of increased coalition payoffs and decreased mitigation for most regions. Over-adaptation furthermore will result in lower mitigation levels by the diverting regions, which has a negative effect on the payoffs of all regions. When  diverges the best performing coalition is no longer stable as the  has no incentive to join this coalition anymore. e new best performing coalition is then that between , , ,  and . e new coalition includes  in the place of . Hence the burden of compensating the low mitigation cost regions for their mitigation efforts in the coalition will shi from  to . e differences in payoffs compared to the previous best performing coalition are given in . All other regions are worse off due to the decreased level of mitigation, were speci cally the  looses with a payoff decrease of .  .e payoffs for  increase by nearly . . Hence by setting its proactive adaptation level extremely high, the  can in uence the coalition formation process and cause a new best performing coalition to form which is more bene cial to the .
e assumption that regions either choose  or  adaptation is somewhat ad hoc. We therefore,

now look at what the effects are of unilateral divergence when other regions adapt to the level optimal in the best performing coalition. When the level of proactive adaptation is chosen which is optimal for the level of temperature change in the best performing coalition ( level), this coalition remains stable, and indeed best performing. is level of proactive adaptation is the level which a singleton would choose given the best performing stable coalition. Hence expecting that the best performing coalition will form and adapting accordingly will result in the best performing stable coalition to indeed be stable. We assume that coalition members set their level of adaptation to be optimal for the degree of temperature change associated with that coalition, i.e. they do not consider the secondary bene ts of changes in coalition bene ts and their share therein, but choose their adaptation level as a singleton would given this coalition.
e rationale for this assumption is that at stage , regions cannot be sure which coalition will emerge in stage . Again one region at a time diverges to either a higher level of adaptation,  adaptation or a lower level of adaptation,  adaptation.
Diverting region
Diverting region payoffs 
 Conclusion
is paper investigated the role of proactive adaptation in mitigation coalition formation. Game theory literature has studied the formation and stability of coalitions, but does not include adaptation in these analyses. is paper introduces adaptation into a three stage cartel game of coalition formation. Adaptation can be divided into two categories, namely reactive and proactive (anticipatory) adaptation. Reactive adaptation takes place aer climate change occurs and hence any threat of higher or lower levels of adaptation will not be credible. Proactive adaptation, on the other hand, takes place before climate change occurs and before coalition formation and hence can change the payoff function for a region and its position in a coalition. Proactive adaptation may thus have an effect on coalition formation and stability.
In this paper we, rstly, analytically derived the optimal level of mitigation and proactive adaptation for both the singletons and coalition members. We can, however, only determine these levels for a given coalition. We therefore introduced the - model which is constructed based on the  model but includes a proactive adaptation decision. is model combines game theory and Integrated Assessment Modelling to create an applied three-stage cartel formation model. is model consists of  heterogenous regions and simulates all possible coalitions () and checks all coalitions for internal and external stability.
Using - we, secondly, investigated how different levels of adaptation will affect the Grand Coalition (where all members join the coalition) payoffs. We rst assumed two levels of adaptation for illustrative purposes, namely  adaptation and  adaptation.  adaptation refers to the optimal level of proactive adaptation for singletons associated for singletons with the Grand Coalition temperature path.  adaptation refers to the level of optimal proactive adaptation in the All Singletons case (i.e. when no  coalition is formed). We found that when no transfers take place low abatement cost regions such as  and  will bene t more when all regions adapt at the  level as opposed to the  level, whereas other regions do not. e reason is straightforward: with higher adaptation levels these regions have to mitigate less. With optimal transfers the bene ts of the Grand Coalition can be shared across regions and low marginal abatement cost regions can be compensated for their high levels of abatement. Hence in the case of optimal transfers all regions are better off when  adaptation is applied.
irdly, the incentives to withdraw from the Grand Coalition were examined. ough payoffs are higher when  adaptation is applied in the Grand Coalition, incentives to withdraw are also higher than in the  case. As adaptation decreases, mitigation in the coalition will increase resulting in higher mitigation costs for coalition members and hence higher incentives to withdraw from the Grand Coalition.
Fourthly, we examined how the different levels of proactive adaptation ( and ) will affect the stable coalitions formed. We saw that with higher levels of adaptation, the damages of regions are limited, making speci c coalitions stable. On the other hand lower levels of adaptation increase damages, giving incentives to certain regions to cooperate whose damages were too low with high adaptation.
Fihly, we examined the best performing stable coalition and what strategic effect proactive adaptation may have. A coalitions performance is measured in the percentage of the gains from cooperation captured by the coalition. e best performing stable coalition in the - model is the coalition between , , ,  and , achieving  of the potential cooperation gains. We investigated the effect of unilateral over-adaptation assuming that all regions adapt at the  level and one region diverts to the  level. We saw that diverting regions bene t from this, while all other regions lose (due to the lower mitigation level in the diverting region). Furthermore, the increased bene ts of diverging coalition members are higher than those of singletons as a coalition member can increase its outside option payoff by over-adaptation, this in turn increasing its share of the coalition bene ts.
When we assumed all regions adapt at the  level and one coalition member diverts to the  level, hence under-adapts, we saw the opposite effects: the diverting region loses, and the others all gain. When assuming that the other regions set their level of adaptation to the optimal level for the best performing stable coalition, we saw roughly the same results but the effects were of a smaller magnitude.
Furthermore we found that certain countries can in uence the stability of the best performing stable coalition, by going beyond the credible level of adaptation and over-adapting extremely. When  extremely over-adapts ( of  adaptation) the best performing stable coalition is no longer stable and hence will not form. e new best performing stable coalition creates larger bene ts for , where  takes the place of  and hence the burden of compensating mitigation efforts by other coalition members.  can thus extremely over-adapt to ensure the formation of a larger coalition, thereby increasing its gains.
e main conclusions of this paper are that adaptation will affect both the incentives to join the Grand Coalition and the stable coalitions. Furthermore, excessive adaptation can be strategically applied by regions to gain higher (coalition) payoffs. is is done at the cost of the other members. ough these effects are small, they nonetheless show that proactive adaptation can affect coalition formation.
ere are several limitations to this analysis. Firstly, we only investigate several level of proactive ad- .A. - model equations aptation (and only unilateral divergences) and do not identify a Nash equilibrium where each region optimises its proactive adaptation given the expected outcome of the second stage of the game.. is next step is le for later research. Secondly we do not consider uncertainty in our model. irdly, our results are dependent on our parameter estimates which are based on the limited empirical literature on the costs and bene ts of adaptation and mitigation. is work would bene t from better estimates on the exact effects of climate change, adaptation and mitigation.
.A - model equations
Payoff function (objective function) 
